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SUBJECT: AGRANAT COMMISSION'S FINAL REPORT

REF: TEL AVIV 1983

1. SUMMARY: GOI HAS RECEIVED 1512 PAGE AGRANAT COMMISSION
FINAL REPORT, OF WHICH ONLY SMALL SECTION HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC,
BRINGING TO CONCLUSION 14-MONTH INQUIRY INTO SHORTCOMINGS
CONNECTED WIH PREPARATION AND CONDUCT OF OCTOBER 1973 WAR.
APPEARNACE OF INALA REPORT CONSTITUES SOMETHING OF A
POLITICAL ANTICLIMAX, WITH EXPECTATINS OF FRESH POLITICAL
REVELATIONS OR NEW CHARGES AGAINST SENIOR POLITICAL PERSONALITIES
LEFT UNFULFILLED. DAYAN IS NOT MENTIONED BY NAME; HE HAS BEEN
NEITHEREXONERATED AND REHABILIITATED NOR FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR
WHAT WENT WRONG, AND HIS POLITICAL FUTURE REMAINSAS UNCERTAIN
AS IT WAS BEFORE. ON POLITICAL LEVEL MAJOR CONCLUSION IS URGENT
NEED FOR LEGISTALTION DEMARCHING WARTIME RESPONSIBLITIES OF
CABINET, DEFENSE MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF. REPORT
DISCUSSES BROAD RANGE OF IDF SHORTCOMINGS, HIGHLIGHTING
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LAX DISCIPLINE, GAPS IN COMMAND COORDINATION, INTELLIGENCE

FAILURES IN FIELD, AND MISMANAGEMENT OF EMERGENCY WAREHOUSES. GOI WILL DISCUSS REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS IN NEAR FUTURE. RECOMMENDATIONS IN FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE, MADE IN APRIL 1974 INTERIM REPORT, REPORTEDLY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO BE IMPLEMENTED.END SUMMARY.

- 2. AFTER 14 MONTHS, FIVE-MAN AGRANAT COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO SHORTCOMINGS PRECEDING AND IN FIRST DAYS OF OCTOBER 1973 WAR HAS PRESENTED ITS FINAL REPORT TO CABINET. ALMOST ENTIRE THREE VOLUME REPORT, COMPRISING 1512 PAGES, IS SECRET, AND ONLY 43 PAGES REPRESWNTING BROAD GENERALIZED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC. INITIAL PUBLIC COMMENTS AND REACTIONS, INCLUDING ASSESSMENTS OF IT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, ARE BASED ONLY ON THIS UNCLASSIFIED SECTION OF OVERALL REPORT.
- 3. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO RECALL THAT PUBLICATION OF INTERIM REPORT IN APRIL 1974 CONSTITUTED DRAMATIC POLITICAL BOMBSHELL (REF). INTERIM REPORT EXONERATED MRS. MEIR, BLURRED ISSUE OF DAYAN'S PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY NOTADDRESSING ITSELF TO BROAD ISSUE OF MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBLITY, AND LED TO RESIGNATIONS OF THEN CHIEF OF STFF ELAZAR, CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ZEIRA AND SUSPENSION OF COMMANDER OF SOUTHERNFRONT GONEN. THIS LED TO STRONG PUBLIC OUTCRY AT WHAT SEEMED TO BE WHITEWASH OF DAYAN, IN TURN PRECIPITATING MRS MEIR'S DECISION TO RESIGN.
- 4. IN COMPARISON, PUBLICATON OF FINAL REPORT HAS CONSTITUTED POLITICAL ANTICLIMAX, DESPITE SPECULATION IN LAST FEW DAYS THAT IT ALSO WOULD HAVE DRAMATIC POLITICAL IMPACT. BOTH POR AND ANTI DAYAN CAMPS HAD FUELD THESE RUMORS FOR THEOR RESPECTIVE PURPOSES, DRAMATIZING POSSIBLITY THAT AGRANAT REPORT WOULD GRANT DAYAN COMPLETE REHABILITATION AND PAVE WAY TO REVIVED POLITICAL CAREER. HOWEVER, THER'S NO SPECIFIC MENTION IN PUBLISHED PART OF REPORT TO DAYAN, ALTHOUGH SECRET PART MAY INCLUDE SOME REFERENCE. THUS, COMMISSION DOES NOT GO BEYOND WHAT WAS LAREDY STATED IN ITS INTERIM REPORT -- I.E., THAT DEFENSE MINISTER IS NOTSUPER CHIEF OF STAFF NOR RESPONSIBLE FOR BATTLEFIELD ACTION DECISIONS. BOTH THOSE WHO EXPECTED DAYAN'S REHABILITATION AND THOSE WHO HOEPD FOR HIS CONDEMNATION ARE DISAPPOINTED. HIS SUPPOTERS WILL PROBABY NOW CLAIM THAT FACT THAT REPORT MAKES NO MENION OF DAYAN MEANS THAT HE CONFIDENTIAL.

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IS IN THE CLEAR. HIS CRITICS ON OTHER HAND WILL SAY THAT DAYAN STILL MUST BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE TO ANTICIPATE WAR AND MOBILIZE RESERVES IN TIME. DAYAN HAS SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT HISNEXT POLITICAL MOVES WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FINAL AGRANT REPORT. NOW THAT IT IS OUT, HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL POSTION REMAINS AS UNCERTAIN AS BEFORE.

5. MORE BROADLY, PUBLICATION OFFINAL REPORT IS

POLITICAL ANTICLIMAX FOR SEVERAL REASONS:(A) IT APPEARS FIFTEEN MONTHS AFTER OCTOBER WAR, AND INTENSE SHOCK OF IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD HAS DISAPPEARED:(B) TRANSITION FROM MEIR TO RABIN GOVERNMENT ITSELF CONSTITUTED POLITICAL RESPONSE TO PREWAR ANDWARTIME FAILURES, AND (C) REPORTS OFPOLITICAL CONCLUSIONS ARE CAREFULLY CONFINED TO GENERALITIES, AND JEOPARDIZE NEITHER GOI IN GENERAL NOR ANY OF ITS LEADING PERSONALITIES IN PARTICULAR.

- 6. AGRANTAT REPORT'S MAJOR POLITICAL CONCLUSION, ALTHOUGH HIGHLIGHTED ONLY IN TERSE FASHION, IS THAT BOTH ON OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL LEVEL THERE IS NEED FOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATION TO DEFINE IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS RESPECTIVE AREAS OF RESPONSIBLITY OF CABINET, DEFENSE MINISTER AND CHIEF OF STAFF IN TIME OF WAR. HOWEVER, COMMITTEE MAKES NO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS MATTER. ASIDE FROM THIS POINT, HOWEVER, FINAL REPORT SHEDS NO FURTHER LIGHT ON COMPLEX ISSUE OF MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBLITY, AND ASSIDUOUSLY AVOIDS ANY FURTHER JUDGMENTS CONCERNING MAJOR POLITICAL PERSONALITIES.
- 7. AMONG SENIOR IDF GENERALS WHO HAVE BEEN EMBROILED IN BITTER CONTROVERSY AS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISCONDUCT AND/OR DEFECTSIN CONDUCT OF WAR IN ITS FIRST PHASE, REPORT'S HARSHEST JUDGMENT FALLS ON GONEN, RECOMMENDING THAT HE NOT BE ENTRUSTED WITH COMBINED LAND FORCES OR ANY PARALLEL COMMAND ON GENERAL STAFF. COMMISSION ALSO REJECTS GONEN'S CHARGES OF FRAUD AND FORGERY IN SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING HIS ROLE IN WAR. REPORTEDLY, GONEN HAS ALREADY STATED HIS DESIRETO REMAIN IN IDF. IN CONTRAST, AGRANAT COMMISSION VINDICATES ARIEL(ARIK) SHARO, SUPPORTING HIS VIEW THAT CERTAIN EXTREME BATTLE CONDITIONS CAN EVEN JUSTIFY OFFICER DISOBEYING ORDERS.
- $8.\ \mbox{IN ITS}$ RECOMMENDATIONS RE IDF'S PERFORMANCE, COMMISSION CONFIDENTIAL

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STRESSES INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEED TO RESTORE MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN ALL INTS COMPONENTS FROM DAILY REGULAR PROCEDURES TO CARRYING OUT BATTLFIELD ORDERS--AND RESTORATION OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN ARMY. MAJOR SHORTCOMINGS WHICH ARE HIGHLIGHTED INCLUDE:(A) LAX DISCIPLINE, (B) FAILURE OF COMMAND COORDINATION, (C) ERRORS OF MILITARY FIELD INTELLIGNECE AND (D) MISMANGEMENT OF

EMERGENCY WAREHOUSES.

9. COMMISSION SO ANALYZED IN GREAT DETAIL MILITARY PREPARATIONS PRECEDING WAR, PUBLIC ATMOSPHERE, DEVELOPMENT OF BATTLES BOTH IN NORTH AND SOUTH AND BEHAVIOR OF COMMANDERS. IN ASSESSING OPERATIONAL WEAKNESSES IN DEFENSIVE STAGE OF WAR (WHICH IN SINAI CONTINUED UNTIL CROSSING OF CANAL ON OCTOBER 14), REPORT OBSERVES THAT ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF VARIOUS

COMMANDERS, PARTICULARLY IN CRITICAL BATTLE ON OCTOBER 8, STEMMED FROM CLINGING TO PREWAR PRECONCEPTIONS RATHER THAN PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION, SOUTHERN COMMAND LACKED CONTROL OVER PROGRESS OF BATTLE AND MISREAD DEVELOPING MILITARY SITUATION.

10. ON FEB 2 CABINET WILL DISCUSS RECOMMENDATIONS OF ZADOK COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED LAST SPRING, AFTER INTERIM REPORT, TO PROPOSE CLARIFICATIONS REGARDING COMPLEX QUESTIONS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIALIAN AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT RECOMMENDATIONS OF INTERIM AGRANAT REPORT REGARDING INTELLIGENCE HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH BY CABINET AND MOST OF THEM REPORTEDLY HAVE ALRADY BEEN ADOPTED.

11. GOI WILL DISCUSS FINAL REPORT IN NEAR FUTURE. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL COMMENT BY RABIN OR OTHER MINISTERS. PARTY OFFICIALS, POLITICAL COMMENTATORS, AND MILITARY EXPERTS HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED, HIGHLIGHTING FAILURE OF REPORT TO ADDRESS POLITICAL ISSUES, AND NOTING THAT PASSAGE OF TIME ITSELF HAS REDUCED ITS POLITICAL SIGNFICANCE. RIGHTWING OPPOSTION LIKUD HAS REASSERTED THAT BLAME SQUARELY ON ENTIRE WARTIME POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. IN CONTRAST, MAPAM AND FAR LEFT MOKED HAVE CHARGED THAT DAYAN IS CHIEF CULPRIT. LABOR PARTY LEADERS, SUCH ASSECRETARY GENERAL ZARMI AND CHAIRMAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN NAVON, HAVE HIGHLIGHTED PROGRESS MADE SO FAR IN CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF INTERIM REPORT AND HAVE REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING ON PERSONALITIES. VELIOTES

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